law until being elected to the Iowa House of Representatives in 1934. He proved ultimately to be an extraordinarily successful campaigner by winning senatorial elections in 1944, 1950, 1956, and 1962 .R epublican colleagues regarded Hickenlooper as the most "consummate skeptic" in the Senate.^ He displayed a conservative skepticism over the development of the welfare state and subsequent deficit spending needed to finance expanding federal programs. In denying that he was a reactionary for opposing President Harry Truman's Fair Deal proposals, Hickenlooper informed a constituent of his concern over the "utter lack of responsibility in the Administration's increased tax and increased spend[ingl policy, combined with the mounting national debt and international problems that are terrific and that must be solved in our own interest."^ Because he disliked unbalanced budgets and waste in government, Hickenlooper was a vigorous, self-appointed watchdog over the activities of Washington's many bureaucrats.
Senator Hickenlooper was a stalwart midwesterner, who, in the words of the New Republic's TRB, "ought to be holding a pitchfork in Grant Wood's 'American Gothic' "^ He had a reputation as the "hardest-working Republican in congress," but was also dubbed the "most anonymous man in the Senate."* Hickenlooper was a highly respected member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for twenty years, six as ranking Republican, but he never gained the national prominence of his Democratic counterpart, J. In 1949 the AEC's Argonne Laboratory reported the disappearance of an ounce of the uranium isotope, U-235. Soon after this incident, it also became known that an AEC research fellowship had been awarded to an acknowledged member of the American Communist party. Now a member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Hickenlooper publicly charged Lilienthal with "incredible mismanagement."^* 1 want to re-emphasize that I have not in any degree impugned Mr. Lilienthal's personal honesty nor his personal patriotism to his country. I believe he is sincere in his beliefs and his policies. It is with his policies and with a continuation of those policies that I sharply disagree. ' just, he did not cease his efforts to remove Lilienthal. He believed that the AEC chairman could not observe the tight security regulations under which he had to operate. Publicly Lilienthal denied being guilty of poor administration, but in his personal journal he admitted that the Argonne "lab's property procedure and our own [AEC's] are sloppy and lax."'* Lilienthal also explained his refusal to have the FBI conduct investigations to establish security clearances for AEC research scholarship recipients: he personally detested secrecy and undue security precautions as conflicting with academic freedom and scholarly inquiry, so "we decided not to ask for FBI investigations."^' The result of this decision was that Hans Freistadt, an Austrian-born student at the University of North Carolina and a self-admitted Communist, received an AEC fellowship. Democrats on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy quickly sought to terminate its investigation of Lilienthal to limit the political fallout. Hickenlooper, on the other hand, attempted to deepen the probe. He also resented President Truman's lack of cooperation with the joint committee. The majority report ultimately did vindicate Lilienthal. Republican senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan befriended Lilienthal but nevertheless acknowledged to Hickenlooper that his investigatory efforts were salutary. "My considered verdict is," he wrote, "that the inquiry disclosed many needs for reforms and improvement; . . . that the commission itself-and thus the country-immediately benefitted from these lessons; and that this whole vast atomic enterprise is bound to be safer as a result of your courageous activities."" On February 15, 1950, only a short while after denying Hickenlooper's charge, Lilienthal resigned as chairman of the AEC. In his diary Lilienthal asserted that the "reason was not Hickenlooper . . . nor the terrible kind of responsibility involved." The "basic reason" for quitting was "secrecy." The latter, he wrote, "was so contrary to my experience . curacy of McCarthy's charges before the investigation started, committee member Henry Cabot Lodge claimed the hearing was "some sort of kangaroo court."" Hickenlooper tried to steer a middle course amid this whirlwind of political passion. To a constituent who criticized him for not publicly condemning those alleged Communists named by McCarthy, Hickenlooper defended his behavior by explaining: "I think this is the proper theory of presumption of innocence that surrounds any one until adequate proof is forthcoming." He also indicated that while being "utterly fair" it was also necessary that the investigation be conducted "vigorously and as deeply as possible. . . . "^Â t the first executive meeting of the Tydings Committee, Hickenlooper and Lodge, the only two Republican members, proposed calling Senator McCarthy before the subcommittee so that he might disclose privately whatever information he possessed. Majority Leader Lucas had made this same recommendation. The Democrats on the subcommittee, however, rejected this suggestion on procedure. McCarthy also notified Hickenlooper that Chairman Tydings refused to permit the Wisconsin senator to cross-examine witnesses appearing before the subcommittee. McCarthy insisted, "I sincerely hope that you and Senator Lodge make it clear that you have no part in this inexcusable failure to bring forth the truth in every manner possible."" At Hickenlooper's urging, the Tydings Committee did ask the State Department for the loyalty files of the eighty-one individuals accused by McCarthy. After examining eight files Hickenlooper concluded that they had been expurgated, yet he felt they were still sufficiently incriminating to make him highly skeptical of the efficacy of the Truman loyalty program; "I don't hesitate to say on this record that the ones I read I would say almost without exception I would not keep in the State Department."" The stakes are too high, so far as future world peace is concerned, tragic though our losses may be, for the United States to now permit communist success in South Vietnam, as it would immediately threaten . . .the Philippines, Australia, the whole Pacific area and have devastating adverse influence on the newly developing nation-states of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. ^Ĥ ickenlooper never changed his "hawk" stance regarding the Vietnam conflict. He doggedly insisted there was "no other course, in the interest of our own security and that of the free world, except to win it." He believed the war had to be fought to a successful military victory so that the "principles of selfdetermination and freedom for the peoples of Southeast Asia are protected and the North Vietnamese aggression halted." When Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York suggested debate on possible revision of the Southeast Asia Resolution, Hickenlooper admonished his colleague: "Frankly, I think this would add a tremendous amount of fuel to the fire and . . . provide a field day for those who have been so highly critical of that aided and abetted the enemy by convincing "the Viet Cong, the Chinese, and the Russians that if they just hang on a while longer in Vietnam internal force will bring on a victory in Vietnam for the aggressor. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong."""
The decision not to run for a fifth Senate term in 1968 was made not because Hickenlooper feared to face the Iowa electorate which he had served for thirty-three years, but because of his advanced age-seventy-three years-and because his wife, Verna, was ill. She died in 1970 and he on September 4, 1971. Fortunately for him, he did not live to witness the fall of South Vietnam to its Communist conquerors; this event would have grieved him deeply. In the realm of international relations Hickenlooper saw America's primary role as that of striving for the "preservation of freedom in the world."*^ That the United States should do less was unthinkable to him. He was a man of sustained purpose who symbolized the unswerving stand of a generation called on repeatedly to fight, sacrifice, and even die for the defense of democracy in faraway places. His thinking did not change when the Vietnam War became unpopular.
During the national debate on Vietnam there were those who claimed that Hickenlooper's old-fashioned patriotism was not only archaic and simplistic, but actually harmful to the nation's real security. The label "cold war warrior" became a denigrating designation within the neo-isolationist atmosphere of the post-Vietnam era. Always skeptical of Kremlin intentions, Bourke Hickenlooper wrote a friend, "It is interesting to note that so long as we had a firm, consistent, strong, yet openminded, policy the Russians made almost no gains and seemed to be moving more toward an accommodation with the West.""
In retrospect a strong argument can be made that Hickenlooper overreacted to the cold war. If there was an area in
